Here's something that the Pittsburgh Pirates' management don't seem to understand about prospects; they are much like fighter pilots.
If you take each year of major league baseball as the equivalent of one combat mission, the attrition statistics are strikingly similar.
About one in five won't make it past the first year/mission; barely more than half last beyond the fifth one. The ones that make it to double digits unhurt are dubbed "aces," and become legends in their own time.
Given these facts, established players used to be valued much higher compared to prospects than they currently are. The old rule of thumb was that an established player was worth two "advanced" prospects(players with some major league playing time that hadn't established themselves) of equivalent quality.
An advanced prospect was worth about two "raw" prospects(players who didn't have major league playing time). So an established player might also be worth four raw prospects of equivalent caliber. That's because even elite raw prospects sometimes don't make it to the "start" line(their first major league game).
Players might also be traded at different ratios, across different ability levels. For instance, a single average, established player might have been traded for an elite prospect, but that's rare.
In 2005, the Dodgers' General manager, Paul DePodesta, was derided for trading an above-average outfielder, Shawn Green, for four, perhaps above-average prospects, that produced only one serviceable, but inferior, player.
The player was Dionner Navarro, who would not make his mark until 2008, long after he had left the Dodgers. Such are the hazards of trading experienced players for prospects.
All that had changed by 2008, teams like the Pirates that wanted prospects had trouble trading for them even using elite established players. For instance, in 2008, the Pirates offered elite outfielder, Jason Bay, to the Tampa Bay Rays for something like elite advanced prospect, Jeff Niemann, and raw prospects Reid Brignac and Wade Davis.
But the Rays were reluctant to part with even two out of these three, let alone all of them. A decade ago, a deal like this would have been a no-brainer.
So the Pirates were pleased to get four players for the elite Bay from two different teams in the Manny Ramirez brouhaha. But it would be generous to describe them, Bryan Morris, Craig Hansen, Andy LaRoche, and Brandon Moss as elite(raw) prospects, even though they once were.
That's because the last three had major league playing time that belied their "elite" label. LaRoche and Moss were at best above average, not elite, advanced prospects, which meant that the Pirates didn't get enough for Bay, even with the pitchers thrown in.
In fact, Craig Hansen was recently kicked off the 40-man roster, meaning that trading for him was a waste.
On the other hand, when the Pirates traded an elite established player, Brian Giles, in 2003, they got elite advanced prospects Bay and Oliver Perez. Bay replaced Giles, and Perez, who had lost his luster by 2006, was traded to the New York Mets along with Roberto Hernandez for Xavier Nady.
This meant that the Pirates ultimately got Bay and Nady for Giles. That was a good deal, but only years after the fact.
A couple days ago, the Pirates traded the elite established player, Nate McLouth, for one advanced prospect, Charlie Morton, and two raw prospects: Gorkys Hernandez and Jeff Locke.
If these prospects are truly "elite," they would just be worth about McLouth when put together. The fear is that they aren't, at least not all of them, meaning that the Pirates dealt themselves out of a good hand again.
The Pirates are not the only team that has had trouble in this regard. When the Minnesota Twins were about to lose elite Johan Santana to free agency, they offered him to the Boston Red Sox for two elite advanced prospects, Jon Lester and Jacoby Ellsbury.
Boston was willing to offer only one of those advanced prospects, plus a raw prospect. The Yankees made a better offer, of an above-average advanced prospect Phil Hughes, and an above average established player, Melky Cabrera. But for some strange reason, the Twins preferred a package of four undistinguished prospects, in the Pirates' style.
On the other hand, DePodesta actually made out all right with his Shawn Green trade. By saving on Green's $15 million salary, he was able to sign the comparable J.D. Drew for slightly less, paying the difference to Navarro and the other prospects.
If you look at it this way, you can see that DePodesta swapped Green for Drew and got the admittedly inferior Navarro for "free."
Monetary savings may be a reason why prospects are now valued. If two low-paid elite prospects can actually do the job of an established elite player, the salary difference could be enormous.
But look at what has been happening in free agency, the past year.
Formerly elite, established players like Jason Giambi and Bobby Abreu can be had for mid-millions, not tens of millions. And the New York Mets effectively picked up Gary Sheffield for $400,000, a rookie salary.
There is no "sure thing," but paying several million dollars for an established player seems like a better bet than gambling on two or three advanced prospects, a move that is often "penny wise, dollar foolish."
There's a Japanese board game, Go, that has two styles, high and low. "High" becomes all the rage for several years while everyone forgets how to play low. Then "low" becomes the ticket to ride, until high recaptures the imagination.
Right now, the "low" road, of prospects, is the preferred road, especially after the success of the Tampa Bay Rays in 2008. But given falling salaries, it may soon be time for teams to rediscover the virtues of "high." And once again, the Pirates look like they will be the last, not first, on this train.
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